

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Dr Ciarán McGlynn

CARTESIAN DUALISM

FUNCTIONALISM

TMA 05

PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS


EXTENDED MIND HYPOTHESIS

WHAT IS MEANT BY CARTESIAN
DUALISM?

WHY IS CARTESIAN DUALISM SO
IMPORTANT?

CARTESIAN DUALISM

- WE ARE COMPOSED OF TWO SUBSTANCES
- MATERIAL BODY (OCCUPIES SPACE; CAN BE PERCEIVED THROUGH THE SENSES)
- IMMATERIAL MIND/SOUL (CHARACTERIZED BY THOUGHT & SENSATION)



ORIGINS OF MIND-BODY PROBLEM

- DESCARTES'S DUALIST HYPOTHESIS BROUGHT THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIND AND BODY INTO MODERN PHILOSOPHY



DESCARTES'S ARGUMENT

- I CAN IMAGINE MYSELF DEVOID OF PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES, BUT STILL EXISTING
- I CANNOT IMAGINE MYSELF DEVOID OF THOUGHT YET STILL EXISTING
- *SUM RES COGITANS* = I AM A THINKING THING
- IF I CAN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY UNDERSTAND MY MIND AS EXISTING APART FROM MY BODY THEN THE TWO ARE DISTINCT IN REALITY
- N.B. SEE FORMAL STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT BY CHIMISSO, p.22

WHAT DOES DESCARTES MEAN BY
CLEAR & DISTINCT IDEAS?


CLEAR & DISTINCT IDEAS

- BY 'CLEAR' DESCARTES MEANS THE IDEA IS 'PRESENT TO THE ATTENTIVE MIND' (COTTINGHAM IN AUDIO; AND BK 5, p20)
- BY 'DISTINCT' DESCARTES MEANS THAT THE IDEA CONTAINS NOTHING WITHIN IT EXCEPT WHAT IS CLEAR (IBID)
- CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS CONTAIN 'NO OBSCURE ELEMENTS' (p.20)

WHAT IS ARNAULD'S OBJECTION
TO DESCARTES'S ARGUMENT?

ANTOINE ARNAULD'S OBJECTION


- IT IS POSSIBLE TO CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY UNDERSTAND THAT A TRIANGLE IS RIGHT-ANGLED YET NOT TO UNDERSTAND THAT SUCH A TRIANGLE IS THE SAME AS ONE TO WHICH PYTHAGORAS'S THEOREM APPLIES



WHAT IS DESCARTES'S RESPONSE
TO ARNAULD'S OBJECTION?


DESCARTES'S REJECTION OF ARNAULD'S OBJECTION

- SOMEONE WHO THOUGHT ABOUT THE TRIANGLES 'CLEARLY & DISTINCTLY' WOULD SEE THAT THE TWO WERE IDENTICAL



CRITICISM: THE PROBLEM OF INTERACTIONISM

- THE CLASSIC MIND-BODY PROBLEM
- HOW DOES A NON-PHYSICAL, NON-EXTENDED MIND INTERACT WITH A PHYSICAL & EXTENDED BODY?
- PINEAL GLAND?




DUALISM HOLDS OUT PROSPECT OF LIFE AFTER DEATH?



WHAT IS MEANT BY METAPHYSICAL
NATURALISM?

METAPHYSICAL NATURALISM


- ALL THAT EXISTS IS THAT WHICH IS REVEALED THROUGH THE PROCESSES OF NATURAL SCIENCE



WHAT WAS THE ORIGINAL
NATURALISTIC THEORY OF THE
MIND?

ORIGINAL MIND-BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY



- MENTAL STATES ARE BRAIN STATES
- E.G. THE MENTAL STATE OF BEING IN PAIN IS IDENTICAL WITH THE BRAIN STATE OF C-FIBRES FIRING



WHAT IS THE KEY OBJECTION TO
THE MIND-BRAIN IDENTITY
THEORY?

MULTIPLE REALIZATION OBJECTION


- THE ROLE OF PAIN CAN BE REALIZED IN MANY DIFFERENT FORMS OF BRAIN AND, HENCE, IN MANY DIFFERENT BRAIN STATES
- PAIN COULD BE REALIZED IN BRAINS WITHOUT C-FIBRES



WHAT IS FUNCTIONALISM?

FUNCTIONALISM

- TYPES OF MENTAL STATE ARE IDENTIFIED WITH PARTICULAR FUNCTIONAL ROLES
- A TOKEN MENTAL STATE IS IDENTIFIED WITH WHATEVER REALIZES THAT ROLE, WHICH IN HUMANS IS BRAIN STATES



WHAT IS THE TYPE-TOKEN
DISTINCTION?

TYPES AND TOKENS

TYPE

- A KIND OF THING
- E.G. THE AMERICAN FLAG

TOKEN

- A PARTICULAR INSTANCE OF A KIND OF THING
- E.G. THE PARTICULAR FLAG FLYING OVER THE AMERICAN EMBASSEY


MENTAL STATE TYPES

- A GENERAL MENTAL STATE THAT PLAYS A PARTICULAR ROLE
- E.G. PAIN




BRAIN STATE TYPES

- C-FIBRES FIRING IN HUMANS
- Z-FIBRES FIRING IN OCTOPUSES
- SOME OTHER STUFF FIRING IN MARTIANS



TOKEN MENTAL STATES

- MY PAIN
- YOUR PAIN
- A MARTIAN'S PAIN
- AN OCTOPUS' PAIN



TOKEN BRAIN STATES

- THE PHYSICAL FIRING OF C-FIBRES IN MY BRAIN
- THE PHYSICAL FIRING OF C-FIBRES IN YOUR BRAIN
- THE FIRING OF SOMETHING IN A MARTIAN'S BRAIN



HOW DOES FUNCTIONALISM
AVOID THE MULTIPLE-REALIZATION
OBJECTION TO MIND-BRAIN
IDENTITY THEORY?


FUNCTIONALISM AVOIDS MULTIPLE- REALIZATION OBJECTION

- THE ORIGINAL MIND-BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY IDENTIFIED MENTAL STATE TYPES WITH BRAIN STATE TYPES
- (THE MENTAL TYPE 'PAIN' WAS IDENTICAL TO THE BRAIN STATE *TYPE* C-FIBRE FIRING – TO BE IN PAIN WAS TO HAVE C-FIBRES FIRING)
- FUNCTIONALISM IDENTIFIES MENTAL TOKENS WITH BRAIN STATE TOKENS (MY TOKEN PAIN IS REALIZED IN MY TOKEN BRAIN STATE)

WHAT IS THE CHINA BRAIN
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT?

THE CHINA BRAIN

- THE INPUT FROM THE NERVOUS SYSTEM IS ROUTED THROUGH CHINA WHICH TAKES OVER THE ROLE OF THE FIRING OF C-FIBRES.
- THE EFFECT IS THEN TRANSMITTED BACK TO THE NERVOUS SYSTEM CAUSING OUTPUTS WE NORMALLY ASSOCIATE WITH PAIN HAVING BEEN EXPERIENCED



WHAT TWO OBJECTIONS TO
FUNCTIONALISM STEM FROM THE
CHINA BRAIN THOUGHT
EXPERIMENT?

TWO OBJECTIONS TO FUNCTIONALISM STEMMING FROM CHINA BRAIN

- EXTRA-CRANIAL OBJECTION
- ABSENT QUALIA OBJECTION

REPLIES TO THE QUALIA OBJECTION

- CAN WE 'REALLY IMAGINE SOMETHING FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT TO US BUT WITHOUT CONSCIOUSNESS?' (p. 73)
- EVEN IF WE CAN IMAGINE IT, COULD IT EXIST?

TMA 05

- ▶ Can functionalism about mental states adequately account for qualia?

GUIDANCE NOTES (SLIDE 1)

- Explain functionalism about mental states, discussing the idea that mental states have distinctive causal (or 'functional') roles in particular
- You may wish to contrast functionalism (briefly) with another account of mental states
- Explain what qualia are


GUIDANCE NOTES (SLIDE 2)

- ‘Discuss a potential tension (or tensions) between functionalism and qualia
- ‘Evaluate whether that tension (or tensions) can be overcome or not’

RESOURCES FOR TMA 05

- BK 5, Chap. 2
- Readings by Lewis and Putnam
- Encyclopaedia entries in REP and SEP
- Audio 'Functionalism about the mind'
- Quiz for Chapter 2

THE 'HARD PROBLEM' OF CONSCIOUSNESS



WHAT IS THE 'HARD PROBLEM' OF
CONSCIOUSNESS?

COLIN McGINN

- McGINN'S PAPER:
'CAN WE SOLVE
THE MIND-BODY
PROBLEM?' (1989)
- McGINN'S PAPER
IS QUOTED IN
CHAPTER 4



McGINN'S QUESTIONS

- HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR TECHNICOLOR CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE TO ARISE OUT OF THE SOGGY GREY MATTER OF THE BRAIN?
- WHAT MAKES THE BRAIN SO DIFFERENT FROM, SAY, THE KIDNEYS? THERE IS NOTHING IT IS LIKE TO BE YOUR KIDNEY
- HOW CAN CONSCIOUSNESS ARISE OUT OF UNCONSCIOUS NEURONS?

WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?

- THOMAS NAGEL (1974)
'WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE
A BAT'



NAGEL'S POSITION

- CONSCIOUSNESS IS WHAT MAKES THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM INTRACTABLE
- REDUCTIONIST APPROACHES HAVE IGNORED THE PHENOMENON OF CONSCIOUSNESS
- 'THE FACT THAT AN ORGANISM HAS CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCES *AT ALL* MEANS...THAT THERE IS SOMETHING IT IS LIKE TO *BE* THAT ORGANISM'
- REDUCTIONISM HAS FAILED TO CAPTURE THIS 'SUBJECTIVE CHARACTER OF EXPERIENCE'
- THIS IS BECAUSE ALL REDUCTIONIST ACCOUNTS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ABSENCE OF THE SUBJECTIVE CHARACTER OF EXPERIENCE

BAT EXPERIENCE

- ‘WE ALL BELIEVE THAT BATS HAVE EXPERIENCE’
- ‘THE ESSENCE OF THE BELIEF THAT BATS HAVE EXPERIENCE IS THAT THERE IS SOMETHING THAT IT IS LIKE TO BE A BAT’
- MOST BATS ‘PERCEIVE THE EXTERNAL WORLD PRIMARILY BY SONAR, OR ECHOLOCATION’
- ‘THERE IS NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT [SONAR] IS SUBJECTIVELY LIKE ANYTHING WE CAN EXPERIENCE OR IMAGINE’
- OUR IMAGINATION IS LIMITED TO OUR OWN HUMAN EXPERIENCE

OBJECTIVE OBSERVATIONS CANNOT GRASP SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE

- WHAT IT IS LIKE TO BE A HUMAN, A BAT OR A MARTIAN 'APPEAR TO BE FACTS THAT EMBODY A PARTICULAR POINT OF VIEW'
- FACTS THAT EMBODY A PARTICULAR POINT OF VIEW CANNOT 'BE REVEALED IN THE PHYSICAL OPERATION OF THAT ORGANISM'
- THE PHYSICAL OPERATION IS IN THE 'DOMAIN OF OBJECTIVE FACTS'
- IF EXPERIENCE HAS NO OBJECTIVE NATURE THEN IT MAKES NO SENSE TO SAY THAT THE OBJECTIVE VIEWING OF PHYSICAL PROCESSES IS THE SAME AS VIEWING MENTAL PROCESSES

RESPONSES TO MCGINN & NAGEL

- 'WE HAVE NO MORE IDEA HOW "SOUL STUFF" COULD HAVE PHENOMENAL CHARACTERS THAN WE DO REGARDING BRAINS' (DOUBLE p. 131)
- IT IS NOT THE BUSINESS OF SCIENCE TO TRY AND SOLVE THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS (CRANE & WRIGHT, p.136)

WHAT IS THE EXTENDED MIND
HYPOTHESIS?


THE EXTENDED MIND THESIS

- ANDY CLARK
- DAVID CHALMERS
- ASPECTS OF OUR NON-CONSCIOUS MINDS EXTEND BEYOND OUR BRAIN
- IN PARTICULAR, BELIEFS CAN BE CONSTITUTED PARTLY BY FEATURES OF THE ENVIRONMENT




EXTERNAL COGNITION

- WHAT EXAMPLES MIGHT WE USE OF THE BRAIN UTILIZING EXTERNAL MEDIA TO CARRY OUT A COGNITIVE TASK?



BRAIN UTILIZING EXTERNAL MEDIA

- MANIPULATING SHAPES ON A COMPUTER SCREEN
- PEN & PAPER
- SCRABBLE TILES
- THE GENERAL PARAPHERNALIA OF LANGUAGE, BOOKS, DIAGRAMS AND CULTURE (C & C, p.8)



WHAT ARE EPISTEMIC ACTIONS?

EPISTEMIC ACTIONS

- ACTIONS THAT 'ALTER THE WORLD SO AS TO AID & AUGMENT COGNITIVE PROCESSES' (C & C, p.8)

WHAT ARE PRAGMATIC ACTIONS?

PRAGMATIC ACTIONS

- ACTIONS THAT ALTER THE WORLD SO AS TO BRING ABOUT DESIRED PHYSICAL CHANGE (C & C, p.8)

WHAT IS MEANT BY 'EPISTEMIC
CREDIT'?

EPISTEMIC CREDIT

- THOSE PARTS EXTERNAL TO THE HUMAN ORGANISM SHOULD GET CREDIT FOR BEING PART OF THE COGNITIVE PROCESS (C & C, p.8)

WHAT DOES DEREK MATRAVERS
MEAN BY 'THE PARITY PRINCIPLE'?

THE PARITY PRINCIPLE

- 'THERE IS A PARITY BETWEEN WORKING OUT THINGS IN THE HEAD AND WORKING OUT THINGS IN THE EXTERNAL WORLD' (BK 5, p.90)

WHAT IS A COUPLED SYSTEM?

A COUPLED SYSTEM

- A TWO-WAY INTERACTION BETWEEN THE HUMAN ORGANISM AND AN EXTERNAL ENTITY – THE COUPLED SYSTEM IS A COGNITIVE SYSTEM (C & C, p.8)

WHAT IS A STANDING STATE
BELIEF?

WHAT IS AN OCCURRENT BELIEF?

STANDING STATE & OCCURRENT BELIEFS

STANDING STATE BELIEF

- ONE THAT IS NOT CONSCIOUSLY IN THE MIND – BUT CAN BE CALLED TO CONSCIOUSNESS

OCCURRENT BELIEF

- ONE THAT IS CONSCIOUSLY IN THE MIND

BE SURE TO TAKE NOTE OF THE
OBJECTIONS THAT CLARK &
CHALMERS DISCUSS TO THE
NOTION OF EXTERNAL COGNITION

OTTO'S NOTEBOOK & INGA'S MEMORY

- IS INGA'S NON-CONSCIOUS MEMORY A MENTAL STATE?
- IS OTTO'S NON-CONSCIOUS ENTRY IN HIS NOTEBOOK A MENTAL STATE?
- IF NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO, THEN OTTO'S MIND EXTENDS TO HIS NOTEBOOK
- WHO IS TWIN OTTO?



NOTE THE VARIOUS OBJECTIONS
TO THEIR THESIS THAT CLARK &
CHALMERS CONSIDER IN THEIR
PAPER

CONSIDER HOW RELEVANT THE
QUALIA OBJECTION IS TO CLARK'S
AND CHALMERS'S THESIS

BE SURE TO CONSIDER CRANE'S
OBJECTIONS TO THE EXTENDED
MIND THESIS (AUDIO DISCUSSION)

WHAT OTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE
EXTENDED MIND THESIS ARE
DISCUSSED IN MATRAVERS'S
BOOK?

HOW FAR SHOULD THE MIND EXTEND?

- MOBILE PHONES?
- OUR BOOKS?
- INTERNET?
- SOCIALLY EXTENDED COGNITION? [COULD MY MENTAL STATES BE PARTLY CONSTITUTED BY THE MENTAL STATES OF OTHER THINKERS?]
- DOES AN EXTENDED MIND IMPLY AN EXTENDED SELF?